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“We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take
risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and
defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us.”
1
— Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

B

oth current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown
increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategiclevel military officers. In their view, too many senior leaders are too cautious,
lacking the “fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity” to engage in the “out-ofthe-box” thinking required to fully understand the new asymmetric2 threats and
challenges posed by the global war on terrorism.3
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech delivered at National
Defense University on 31 January 2002, made clear that in his view, “The future
will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities
that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances.”4 General
Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently noted how al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters have “made lots of adaptations to our tactics and we’ve
got to continue to . . . try to out-think them and to be faster at it.”5 At the heart of the
issue is whether and how the operational art and leadership attributes differ, if at
all, in symmetric versus asymmetric approaches to warfare.
The conceptual underpinning of these statements and criticisms also
raises significant questions about whether asymmetric warfare6 poses unique
challenges for strategic leaders or whether it more appropriately requires timeSummer 2003
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tested leadership competencies applied with more creativity and risk-taking. The
answers to these important questions would seem to hold great significance for
strategic leaders’ readiness and the leadership competencies needed for asymmetric warfare.
This article seeks to identify the adaptive linkages that exist between
strategic leader competencies and the mental readiness7 for asymmetric and
more conventional warfare. Fortunately, the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
seem to offer a framework to help guide the needed adaptation in strategic leader
thinking with regard to asymmetric approaches to warfare.8 An identification of
these characteristics in the writings of both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz offers the opportunity to adapt their concepts to the present and anticipated challenges of
asymmetric approaches to warfare. However, it is also important to recognize
that while “asymmetry is important to strategy . . . not everything is asymmetry.”9

Conventional Leaders and Asymmetric Warfare
It is unfortunate that so-called “conventional warriors”10 are finding
both their relevance and adaptability being challenged because of asymmetric
warfare. At its core, this issue raises the question of whether conventional warriors can effectively lead in unconventional (i.e., asymmetric) wars.11 For some,
the answer to this important question will seem obvious. They will intuitively
sense and view asymmetric approaches to warfare as counterinsurgency once
was viewed, as “secondary or peripheral to conventional threats.”12 However,
“conventional” and “symmetrical” are often seen as synonymous, since by definition symmetrical refers to instances when “our force and the enemy force are
similar (e.g., land versus land).”13 For many, this similarity implies predictable,
and denying that predictability lies at the heart of asymmetric approaches.
This is no small matter given the various adjectives used to describe the
current national security environment: uncertain, dynamic, fluid, unpredictable,
unknown, turbulent, asymmetric, and complex.14 Identifying and finding ways
for strategic leaders to bridge and “leverage” the leadership competencies
required in symmetrical scenarios to apply them effectively in asymmetrical
warfare could have important implications for strategic leader training, development, and doctrine.
The debate about whether leadership differs in symmetric versus asymmetric war was perhaps unwittingly played out shortly after the deployment of US
military forces into Afghanistan. The national press initially raised a chorus of crit-
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icism directed at the Commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks,
questioning whether he was “the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong
time.”15 General Franks was also described as “a classic Army officer: a good soldier, a solid man and low-key personality.” But for many, this implied that he was
also “plodding,” “very unimaginative and timid.” In other words, some viewed
him as “out of his depth,” “a conventional soldier in an unconventional war.”16
Time and the tides of war have altered the circumstances, revealing how
wrong the press was in its initial criticism of General Franks; he has revealed his
adaptability to this new, asymmetric type of warfare. However, embedded within
those expressed concerns lies the perception, expectation, and perhaps the reality
that asymmetric approaches require a strategic leader to possess a special mental
readiness to accept and prepare for this new threat.

Leadership Challenges Posed by Asymmetric Threats
Senior defense officials have made it abundantly clear that in their
view, the challenges posed by asymmetric approaches to warfare require a realignment of the way strategic leaders think and plan.17 Indeed, some recent slating of officers into top military jobs has been described as a signal to encourage
more fresh thinking and innovation.18 The need to “think differently” has been a
recurring theme in defense transformation efforts as well as in preparing US military forces for asymmetric threats.19
There also is a growing consensus that US military forces will increasingly face “adaptive adversaries.”20 These adaptive foes will attempt to find imaginative ways to match their strengths against our vulnerabilities, combining
unconventional approaches to achieve a synergistic effect.21 Given the US military’s overwhelming strength and dominance, many believe that future adversaries have no choice but to seek every advantage in an effort to attack our will to
fight, trying to find ways to exploit and undermine the psychological and physical
advantages that our superior technology and information dominance provide.22
It also is a given that newer technology will become increasingly available to potential adversaries. And even without access to advanced technology,
as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 revealed, adversaries might also
find unexpected ways to use familiar technology and our own freedoms against
us. While current US information dominance can overwhelm an adversary, that
advantage is likely to change by 2010.23
Therefore, we must face the challenge posed by asymmetric approaches to warfare, applying our strategic mental readiness and agility to act on
what we know in order to influence the outcome.24 According to Secretary
Rumsfeld,25 we must do as Frederick the Great advised in his General Principles
of War. That is, we must examine our potential vulnerabilities and ask ourselves,
“If we were the enemy, what type of force design would we form?” We must then
fashion the forces and capabilities to deter and defeat these potential threats. To
achieve this goal, we also must “encourage a culture of creativity and intelligent
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risk-taking . . . [and] become more proactive and not reactive,” anticipating new
threats before they emerge while developing new capabilities that can dissuade
and deter those emerging threats.26

Overview of Asymmetry and the Need for Mental Readiness
Because of the uncertain and changing dynamics of asymmetric approaches, some military strategists have suggested that the writings of Sun Tzu
seem more relevant than those of Carl von Clausewitz.27 Both theorists offer
many useful concepts in emphasizing and identifying the mental readiness and
leadership competencies relevant for a strategic leader in an asymmetric war.
One consideration in judging whether Sun Tzu may seem more relevant
than Clausewitz depends on whether one views asymmetry as “what someone
may do to us” or as “something we do to them.” Asymmetry is better thought of as
a method that applies equally to either side of a conflict, and it is important to recognize that. To the contrary, however, a careful reading of the comprehensive
definition of asymmetry provided in the 1999 Joint Strategy Review reveals a potential vulnerability for strategic leaders in their thinking about asymmetry since
it specifically defines asymmetry as something done to US military forces to undermine their conventional military strength. For example:
Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths
while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the
United States’ expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches] generally
seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ
innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied at
all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—across the spectrum of
military operations.28

Thinking more broadly, some military strategists have proposed a definition of
asymmetric approaches that recognizes the potential for its use by either side.
They view strategic asymmetry as more general and proactive, describing it thus:
Acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize
one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or
gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies,
values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be
short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological
and physical dimensions.29

Joint Vision 2020 reinforces the need for strategic leaders to maintain a
more proactive view of asymmetry. This broader view also prompts the need to
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identify and understand how asymmetric factors will influence operational art,
since decisions even at a tactical level will become even more likely to influence
operational-level activities.30 Consequently, strategic leaders must also emphasize
and foster this understanding in their subordinates to ensure they also display a
mental readiness to deal with asymmetric threats. They too “will be challenged by
significant responsibilities at tactical levels in the organization and must be capable of making decisions with both operational and strategic implications.”31
This reveals how many of our young officers must prepare to confront
“volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situations,” demanding of them increasing levels of “intellect, initiative, and leadership.”32 Indeed, US joint doctrine calls for all US military forces to possess a “strategic agility” that imparts an
almost anthropomorphic quality to the military itself, rather than the people who
constitute it. For example, the capstone regulation for all US joint doctrine, Joint
Publication 1, calls for “the ability to adapt, conceptually and physically, to
changes in the international security environment.”33 Of course, it is not a military force per se that adapts or changes, but rather the people within the force,
along with the concepts, doctrine, and intellectual preparation used to train, lead,
and guide the force.
As the definitions above make evident, asymmetric approaches attempt
to disrupt and undermine a strategic leader’s ability to direct and control rational
and deliberate actions. Thus, asymmetric approaches seek to unsettle, disorient,
misdirect, and deny the very purpose, strategy, core competencies, and critical
processes that allow strategic leaders to provide effective leadership to the organization. Asymmetric approaches have the express intent to create maximum uncertainty and ambiguity for the leader and for the led.
In many ways, the call for “strategic agility” recognizes the prospect of
how asymmetric approaches add to the complexity of warfare, prompting the need
for readiness to rapidly shift to vastly different operations (e.g., conventional, unconventional, military operations other than war, anti-terrorist, humanitarian,
peacekeeping, etc.). Consequently, it seems a given that the multifaceted nature of
asymmetric approaches to warfare will demand of strategic leaders the intellectual
agility and a “competence of adaptability”34 to adjust rapidly to vastly different operations across a full-spectrum of operations at all levels of war.35

Mental Readiness: Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared
Williamson Murray has written, “The profession of arms is the most demanding calling not only physically but intellectually.”36 Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld has stated, “We . . . are going to have to fashion a new vocabulary and
different constructs for thinking about what it is we’re doing.”37 Such sentiments
challenge the strategic leader to possess a mental and physical readiness to successfully deal with the uncertainties and ambiguities of war. Asymmetric threats,
by their nature, attempt to increase and capitalize on this uncertainty and ambiguity by exploiting and countering US technological and operational advantages.
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23

Clausewitz seems to anticipate the challenges for a strategic leader in
dealing with asymmetric warfare by noting, “In war everything is uncertain, and
calculations have to be made with variable quantities.” This seems to contrast
with Sun Tzu’s view that war is “calculated, certain, and controlled.” But Sun
Tzu also places great emphasis on using both psychological and informational
asymmetry to gain an advantage:
All warfare is based on deception. . . . When capable, feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity. . . . Offer the enemy bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. . . .
Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. . . . I make the enemy see my
strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths.38

This passage from Sun Tzu leads many to believe his writings are more
relevant to asymmetric warfare. However, some may read this passage and sense
that it applies only to how others may use asymmetric threats against US forces.
If so, that should give the reader some pause for concern, for in that impression of
irrelevancy lies the threat that asymmetric approaches bring.
As Michael Handel points out, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz (at least
with regard to “real war”) would probably agree that war is more of an art than a
science. Thus, strategic leaders must grapple with the fact that there is no single,
optimal solution for either asymmetric or symmetric types of war, given the endless complexities of war. However, asymmetric approaches seek to create and
then capitalize on uncertainty. Therefore, effective strategic leaders remain open
to these endless complexities and appreciate how “military action is intertwined
with psychological forces and effects.”39

Leadership Attributes
What follows is a selective representation of some of the leadership attributes and competencies deemed important for strategic leaders to create a mental readiness to develop and promote “strategic agility” in their thoughts and
actions as they prepare to meet the multifaceted challenges posed by asymmetry.
Many of these leadership attributes and competencies are time-tested and effective
in symmetrical warfare. However, asymmetrical threats and warfare require us to
recognize that the relative emphasis on certain of these attributes has changed.
l Situational Awareness. A strategic leader’s ability to recognize what
is happening and to maintain vigilance for threats, change, and opportunity is one
of the most difficult challenges of asymmetric warfare. There is an increasing dependence on information dominance to facilitate maintaining situational awareness, which provides an obvious strength for US forces. Precisely because
information dominance does provide strength, however, the resources required
to maintain this dominance also pose lucrative targets for asymmetric threats; adversaries will attempt to maximally disrupt our ability to maintain the situational
awareness these resources offer. Consequently, it is important for our leaders to
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not become too dependent on “the new technology of operations”40 and continue
to develop the time-tested leadership competencies, expertise, and experience
needed to maintain situational awareness by other means.
Sun Tzu also emphasizes the importance of the need for clear perception (i.e., situational awareness), by noting the importance of the “ability to examine human factors.” He cautions against being “a general unable to estimate
his capabilities or comprehend the arts of expediency and flexibility when faced
with the opportunity to engage the enemy.” Such a commander “will advance in a
stumbling and hesitant manner, looking anxiously first to his right and then to his
left . . . [placing] his confidence in unreliable reports, believing at one moment
this and at another that.”41
By its nature, asymmetric warfare may entail attempts to degrade an opponent’s situational awareness by doing the unexpected, by making things appear entirely different from what is expected, or by creating an impression of
what is hoped for (e.g., deception operations).42 According to Clausewitz, this
difficulty constitutes one of the most serious sources of “friction” in war.
Asymmetric approaches attempt to capitalize on increasing an opponent’s friction, which, according to Clausewitz, refers to the “uncertainties, errors,
accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen.”43 Friction represents every extraneous matter, which all combine as a force, like inertia, that then makes “the apparently easy so difficult.” It is also important to recognize that asymmetric
approaches, by design, intend to capitalize on and create both psychological and
physical “friction” to degrade, deter, or deceive an opposing force.
l Strength of Mind. Clausewitz’s concept of “strength of mind” or
character offers a conceptual template for how to counter the uncertainty when
situational awareness is lost. For example, he notes the importance of maintaining “the ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional stress and violent
emotion . . . [of] maintaining one’s balance in spite of them.”44 Clausewitz notes
how in the rush of events our thoughts are governed more by our feelings than
logic. This outcome is exactly what the adversary posing the asymmetric threat
hopes for by denying a strategic leader the situational awareness he or she has
grown to depend on.
According to both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, it is precisely at these times
that strength of character matters most, because such situations will cause one to
call his or her intentions into question. In other words, the resulting uncertainty
begins to kindle a flame of self-doubt about the appropriateness of one’s intentions or plans. Retired Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer captured the essence of
this by noting how “the challenge is to implant methods for raising awareness
about the cognitive and emotional processes that result in decisions.”45 To make
effective decisions, Clausewitz cautions that a strategic leader’s mind must be
permanently armed with new information and reevaluation. This parallels in
many ways Sun Tzu’s notion that “if wise, a commander is able to recognize
changing circumstances and to act expediently.”46
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l Coup d’oeil: The “Inward Eye” of Truth. Clausewitz’s concept of
“coup d’oeil” provides a useful approach for a strategic leader in dealing with an
asymmetric threat. According to Clausewitz, when a strategic leader confronts
the relentless struggle of the unforeseen (like asymmetric threats seek to present), two qualities are indispensable. The first involves possessing an intellect
that “retains the glimmerings of inner light that leads to truth.” The second involves possessing the “courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”47
Implied in this use of the “inward eye” is the need to remain open to possibilities other than those previously considered. In asymmetry, one seeks to use
methods different from those expected, requiring an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. That allows the strategic leader “the quick recognition of a
truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study
and reflection.”48 This reinforces the importance of “long study and reflection”
on possible asymmetric approaches that might counter one’s own strengths.
l Intelligent Risk-Taking. In an address to US Naval Academy in May
2001, Commander-in-Chief George W. Bush stated, “As President, I am committed to fostering a military culture where intelligent risk-taking and forwardthinking are rewarded, not dreaded. And I’m committed to ensuring that visionary
leaders who take risks are recognized and promoted.” This echoes Clausewitz’s dialectic of military genius (revealed in initiative and creativity) and leadership to
counter the erosion of control by the friction of asymmetric approaches.
Clausewitz used the phrase “psychological fog” to describe the confusion or uncertainty in war. The horrors of war emotionally rob one’s ability to
maintain insight. Since by definition, asymmetric approaches seek to add to the
uncertainty in war, one’s mental processes will strive to bring order to disorder,
imparting meaningfulness to still-unfolding events, and then force one to filter
and prioritize information.
According to Clausewitz, this inability to know with certainty (i.e., the
“fog of war”) “wraps around three-quarters of all activities.” An adversary attempts an asymmetric approach precisely to increase this fog of war, and our increased use of information dominance attempts to reduce it. However, since
there can be no guarantees, strategic leaders must develop and reveal greater
mental agility and readiness to react without being overly dependent on information dominance. In other words, a strategic leader can no longer be a “pure, narrow military thinker and worry [only] about fire and maneuver.”49
l Mental Readiness: Reducing the Fog of War. The only thing that strategic leaders truly have control of is their own imagination, creativity, and intuition. Strategic leaders use these attributes, along with their “iron will and a
powerful sense of purpose” to overcome the forces of asymmetric friction50 and
to cut through and counter the fog of war. Thus, to counter asymmetric threats,
strategic leaders must develop a mental readiness to control the effects of “friction” and “fog” by anticipating and mitigating those effects on their own forces
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while at the same time, through their actions, attempting to create more friction
and fog for their opponent.
For many, asymmetric approaches to warfare may create a sense of “not
fighting fair,” a sense of “that’s not the American way of war.” In reality, asymmetric war, like all types of wars, will take its form from the interplay of ideas,
emotions, and conditions that prevail at the time. As such, asymmetric methods
attempt to create and then exploit the uncertainties and influences that produce a
natural inertia, or friction. Somewhat paradoxically, this asymmetric friction is
derived and develops from all the same “inconsistencies, imprecision, [and] timidity of man” that combine to inhibit the escalation of violence in Clausewitz’s
concept of “real war.” Nonetheless, we must recognize and remain cognizant of
how the burning embers of asymmetric wars can ignite the larger forces of
Clausewitz’s “real war.”
l Knowing Yourself and Your Enemy. In asymmetric warfare, strategic
leaders will need to gain an even better understanding of their own vulnerability
to fall victim to existing beliefs and wishful thinking. Consequently, in asymmetric warfare it becomes even more imperative for a commander to wisely use the
available intelligence to counter the vulnerability that deception creates and to
gain insight into the enemy’s mind, intentions, and capabilities. Clausewitz cautions that “one of the most serious sources of friction in war” is the difficulty of
accurate recognition and assessment of one’s own strength and performance,
much less the enemy’s.51 There is a need to readdress and reemphasize the importance of this self-assessment process.
Part of this self-assessment process in preparing for asymmetric warfare
involves the need to remain vigilant and open to the possibility of deception operations against one’s forces. By definition, “successful deception is usually designed
to fit in with and magnify its target’s own preconceptions . . . [making] the victim
deceive himself, while minimizing the amount of genuine information that has to
be given.”52 Therefore, strategic leaders can reduce the likelihood of falling victim
to deception operations by seeking to achieve a thorough understanding of their
own and their enemy’s innermost thoughts, expectations, and plans.53
As General Montgomery Meigs has pointed out, both self-study and
intellectual preparation have always been important for strategic leaders.54
Asymmetry makes these factors even more important. This is why adversaries
intending to use asymmetric approaches will often find deception operations
useful in identifying an opponent’s center of gravity or in making him more vulnerable. For Clausewitz, deception was important to the extent that it is helpful in
achieving surprise, one of the trademarks of asymmetric approaches.
Along with increased awareness for deception operations is the need
for strategic leaders to remain vigilant for asymmetric approaches using the technology of psychological manipulation. While strategic leaders are no doubt familiar with the asymmetric effects of “physical precision,” they need also to
increase their understanding of “psychological precision.” Emerging threats will
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“The challenges posed by asymmetric
approaches to warfare require a realignment
of the way strategic leaders think and plan.”

allow for psychological precision that will help to shape a “military operation to
attain the desired attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of the enemy and/or global
observers” of the action.55 This emerging “psychotechnology” will actualize Sun
Tzu’s notion that “all warfare is based on deception,” giving militaries the potential ability to psychologically manipulate armies, causing “intense fear, calm, or
whatever reaction is required.”56

Intellectual Abilities: Comprehending the Asymmetries
l Intellect. It goes without saying that the character and intellect of the
leader will always matter, but this blend becomes even more important in being
able to see through the uncertainty, chance, and probability needed for both operational instinct and adaptability57 in countering asymmetric threats. This reflects
the diversity of threats and challenges posed by asymmetry. Clausewitz called on
the “higher powers of the mind” to provide a “sense of unity, and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a
thousand remote possibilities.”58 To do this effectively, one must be aware of and
appreciate past asymmetrical threats in order to then anticipate the possible and
creative expression of new threats. That is, one’s judgment should not be constrained or harnessed by merely remaining vigilant for imitative acts.59
Asymmetric approaches to warfare increase the importance of remaining
open to these possibilities. The requirement for greater flexibility of thought also
places increased demands on one’s judgment and intuition. This is because of the
difficulties inherent in the asymmetry of forces, intents, and operational designs.
For example, asymmetric approaches attempt to deny the strategic leader situational understanding that he can then use to shape his vision of the operational design needed to counter the threat. An effective leader must therefore use his
intellect to combine experience, intuition, and judgment to create new strategies.
l Intuition (“Gut feeling”). The mental readiness required for dealing
with asymmetric threats also calls for a continual development of one’s intuition.
Clausewitz recognizes that at times, “Action can never be based on anything
firmer than instinct, a sensing of the truth.”60 While studies have shown that many
of our strategic leaders are more comfortable with data than with intuition,61 true
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intuition is not dependent upon carefully generated or assessed data. It involves
the ability to comprehensively understand the impact and interplay of human factors, to then exploit fleeting opportunities, and to make rational calculations in
the face of danger. S. L. A. Marshall also makes reference to how one must train
the eye “to look for the signs of order and of progress amid the confusion” of war
and to “make men knowledgeable of human nature as it is and as it reacts under
the various and extreme stresses of the field.”62 While his sage advice applies
equally to symmetric or asymmetric approaches, asymmetric threats may make
this more difficult to achieve.
This also suggests the importance of knowing about and understanding
the mind of the opponent and what he is likely to do. The importance of this may
need renewed emphasis. For example, while an earlier, 1986 edition of the US
Army’s authoritative guide for fighting wars, Field Manual 100-5, Operations,
addressed this important fact, the later 1993 version offered only a brief description. Consequently, the 1986 version appears more relevant to the challenge
posed by asymmetric threats. It encouraged operational commanders to consider
how at times the operational center of gravity may exist as an abstract of the
“mental and psychological balance of a key commander [or potential adversary]”
and pointed out that identifying an “enemy’s center of gravity requires extensive
knowledge of his organizational make-up, operational patterns, and physical and
psychological strengths and vulnerabilities.”63 Thus, in countering the threats
posed by asymmetric warfare, we still must “get inside an adversary’s decisionmaking cycle (his operational ability to react)” and exploit his weakness while
effectively concentrating our own combat power.64
l Boldness. While Sun Tzu argues the strategic leader should take prudent, cautious, and calculated risks, Clausewitz sees greater benefit in “daring
and risk-tasking,” with a decisive quality (requiring greater reliance on intuition
and temperament). However, asymmetric threats seek to create uncertainty, undermining one’s ability to act in a calculated, decisive manner, increasing the
probability of an uncalculated bold or rash reaction. Therefore, a strategic leader
must exercise self-discipline to avoid “rashness, excessive audacity, blind impetuosity or foolish ambition [that] are all easily exploited by the enemy and most
dangerous to any allies, for a general with such defects in his character will naturally fall victim to all kinds of stratagems, ambushes, and trickery.”65
l Self-Reliance. Self-reliance then becomes the best defense against
acting on the pressures of the moment. Since asymmetric approaches attempt to
create confusion and doubt about a planned operation or ability, they can cause
the strategic leader to lose confidence in his or her earlier judgment. As Clausewitz notes, an “iron will-power” can overcome this friction, “but of course wears
down the machine as well.”66
Therefore, a strategic leader’s readiness (mental, physical, and moral)
must allow an openness to both the possible and the most likely adversary dispositions, followed by bold actions and movement to deny the adversary the opSummer 2003
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portunity to reciprocate. However, as General Myers said of al Qaeda and the
Taliban, some adversaries adapt quickly. We must therefore become more adept
at anticipating their adaptations by moving more quickly, boldly, and decisively.
To do so requires one to systematically reason through what is happening and
also accurately assess what is not happening.67 By using these approaches in
maintaining situational awareness, the strategic leader can exploit opportunities
or at least deny adversaries the ability to conduct “psychologically decisive” operations against his forces.

Leadership and Policy Implications of Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric warfare likely will make it even more difficult for policymakers to exercise control and ensure that actions taken to counter asymmetric
threats retain their relationship to expressed policy. For example, war provides
the state with the ends and means to protect or enhance its vital interests relative
to other states. Most accept Clausewitz’s view that war should be a rational activity that is entered into only to serve the interests of the state as a continuation of
policy, but viewed as the policy of last resort. Importantly, as Clausewitz states,
“war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument.”
Asymmetric approaches could present a political wild card, however,
since they may entail the use of irrational means to achieve the desired ends. In
other words, in asymmetric warfare the “rational calculus” is not necessarily observed. Thus, asymmetric warfare may lessen the ability of policymakers to control the magnitude and duration of war and undermine their ability to determine
at what point their expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object
of the war. As such, asymmetric warfare upsets the Clausewitzian pronouncement that states, “Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political
object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”68 As terrorist states
and adversaries have found, with asymmetric warfare small but effective expenditures of effort hold the possibility to provide significant and disproportional
political gain.
Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognized that in war nothing is certain.
This is perhaps even truer with the more ambiguous nature of asymmetric warfare. While Sun Tzu aspired to find predictability, he too recognized that in war
there are no constant conditions. With any war, whether symmetric or asymmetric, once the forces of war are unleashed, neither military commanders nor
policymakers retain complete control over their actions. Each side reacts to the
actions of the other in a continuing escalation of reciprocal acts. Complete control is not possible because, once unleashed, the forces of war freely operate and
are “obedient to no law but their own.”69
Moreover, as effort is expended to wage war, friction makes everything
difficult. Again, this is true for both symmetric and asymmetric wars, both of
which involve danger along with physical and emotional exertion for the forces
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involved. In conventional wars, these elements coalesce into the concept of general friction and serve as a countervailing force, propagating greater and greater
amounts of difficulty and uncertainty, which serves to eventually bring conventional wars to an end. Since asymmetric wars may not always have clear, achievable political objectives, they are less likely to encounter the countervailing
forces that cause them to stagnate or fizzle out. Consequently, the need for strategic leaders to prepare for protracted asymmetric war remains clear.

Conclusion
This article has addressed the vital importance for strategic leaders to
foster and develop the mental readiness to think differently and identified some
leadership competencies to enhance their ability to respond to the threats posed
by asymmetric warfare. It is the nature of asymmetric threats that we cannot
know with certainty the exact nature of the threats likely to emerge.
Asymmetric approaches, when successful, attempt to make it hard to
fight the way we want to, perhaps even denying us the capability to fight at all
(e.g., against an elusive, non-state actor), potentially leading to feelings of “military irrelevancy or impotency.”70 While it is true that the mental readiness needed
for asymmetric warfare parallels, in many ways, the preparation needed for
“symmetrical” wars, this essay points out that the emphasis and demand for certain leadership attributes and characteristics will rise.
Clausewitz offers a model of the needed end-state by making it clear
what qualities must exist for “military genius.” These stated qualities seem even
more relevant for asymmetric approaches, as Clausewitz relates how a “military
genius” has a calm and “inquiring mind”71 with a “comprehensive approach
rather than a specialized approach.”
To remain relevant, our professional military education system and officer corps need to begin in earnest to identify and adapt the attributes and methods required to ensure strategic leader readiness to counter, deter, or defeat
operational and strategic asymmetric threats and war. We should strive to produce more “military geniuses” among our strategic leaders by helping them to
become more mentally adaptable and ready to proactively respond to emerging
threats. In doing so, we need to ensure that our strategic leaders can demonstrate
the new ways of thinking about conflict by identifying and adapting the procedures and processes that make sense in preparing for asymmetric warfare, and
then educating the entire force in how to use them.72
Strategic leaders can best prepare for the uncertainty posed by asymmetric threats by ensuring that they “maximize [their] conceptual and organizational adaptability and flexibility.”73 Only then can strategic leaders respond to
the calls by President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld to “think differently” by inculcating a conceptual framework that allows for more proactive preparation to
counter asymmetric threats.
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The questions and criticisms directed toward General Tommy Franks
about whether he was too “conventional” to lead an asymmetric war have been
appropriately muted. He has demonstrated his ability to master and succeed in an
increasingly complex and uncertain asymmetric warfare by nurturing and valuing the same innovation and creativity deemed so important by Clausewitz and
Sun Tzu. However, the fact that the early criticisms were even raised should give
us pause for concern. It suggests it is time to respond to calls by our civilian leadership for senior military officers to develop a greater openness to and consideration of this new type of threat, along with developing new ways of thinking as
our military force transforms around us.
An adaptive, “transforming” force is by nature a changing force. Fortunately, we have Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, two great military strategists and philosophers, to help guide that openness to change, while providing direction and
relevance to our preparation for asymmetric war and the transformation of the
“American Way of War” currently under way.
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